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Abstract
This paper intends to analyze the impact of transferences over the formal and informal 
labor supply from the family heads. For the analyze of the effects in scope of the entrance 
decisions in job market it was estimated a multinomial logit, while in the scope of the 
working time it was used a variation of the method of Durbin and McFadden (1984) 
for selection bias correction. It has verified that transferences have positive effect over 
the probabilities that the individual doesn’t work and does informally work. However, 
this last one seems to be related to a substitution effect, once it has been observed a 
parallel negative effect over the probability to work on the formal sector. It has been 
obtained yet that the benefits negatively impacts on the offered hours by the family 
heads whether in the formal or non-formal sector, effect that has happened to be 
verified on the hours offering in formal sector of all individuals. On the other hand, 
as we consider the hours of working of those who are engaged in informal sector, 
it has obtained that income transferences perform not as a discourage issue but as a 
magnifier factor of worked hours.
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Resumo
Este artigo se propõe a analisar o impacto das transferências de renda governamentais 
sobre a oferta de trabalho formal e informal dos chefes de família no Brasil. Adicional-
mente analisam-se os seus efeitos sobre as decisões dos indivíduos de entrar no mer-
cado de trabalho. Para o primeiro objetivo estimou-se um logit multinomial, enquanto 
no âmbito da oferta de trabalho utilizou-se uma variação do método de Durbin e Mc 
Fadden (1984), que corrige o problema de viés de seleção. Dentre outros resultados 
obtidos, as transferências de renda contribuíram para o aumento da probabilidade de 
♦   Os autores agradecem o apoio financeiro do CNPq para a realização deste trabalho.
Est. Econ., São Paulo, vol. 43, n.1, p. 29-50, jan.-mar. 2013
30                                                                                  Emerson Marinho e Sergio Mendes
um chefe de família estar desempregado ou trabalhar no mercado informal. Por outro 
lado, diminui a sua chance de ficar empregado no setor formal caracterizando assim um 
efeito substituição. Com relação à oferta no mercado de trabalho, as transferências de 
renda governamentais parecem estar desincentivando o aumento de horas de trabalho 
tanto no setor formal quanto informal.
Palavras-Chave 
transferência de renda, oferta de trabalho, viés de seleção
1. Introduction
This article aims to empirically assess the impact of government 
income money transfers on work-hour supply in the formal and in-
formal job markets for heads of families in Brazil. Also here, there 
is an additional analysis of personal job market entrance choices.
Besides getting scientific interest, pro-poor fiscal policies based on 
income transfer programs also lead to numerous political and social 
discussions about these policies´ probable adverse effects. Among 
which, there is the hypothesis that benefits might be an income 
source that leads individuals to lose interest in conventional labor. 
Another likely effect is the decrease in savings which is detrimental 
to credit, financing, and capital accumulation, thus affecting national 
economic growth. The likely reduction of working hours caused by 
government transfers might lead to higher social dependency and les-
sen the effects of economic growth on poverty rates. However, such 
effect is still controversial and there has been no consensus among 
authors dealing with the matter. Some of these authors are assessed 
in the next section of this work. In the latest decades, social protec-
tion programs have been created and spread as a method of fighting 
poverty and income inequalities. Be it in the form of coverage, be it 
in the form of benefits. Pinned to conditionalities that aim towards 
healthier and wealthier human capital, these programs despite diffe-
rences in design, usually focus on needy social classes, and set out to 
fight poverty in short and long terms. Due to their large absorption 
of public budget resources, such programs have been the center of 
many theoretical and empirical analyses that aim to measure these 
programs´  accuracy and efficiency, especially when it comes to po-
verty reduction and children´ s labor. Examples of such are the works 
of Hoffmann (2006), Cardoso and Souza (2004), Ferro and Kassouf 
(2005), Bourguignon et al. (2002) and Soares et al. (2006).
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Considering the relevance of the subject for the national politics 
and economy this article sets out to empirically assess how income 
transfers affect formal and informal labor supply for heads of fa-
milies and these individuals´  job market entry choices. In order to 
achieve these goals, two econometric models will be used. The first 
one is the logit multinomial model; its dependent variable is the 
“unemployed, informally employed or formally employed” category. 
The impact of income transfers on decisions about entering the job 
market is thoroughly investigated in this model which also controls 
determiners such as individual and socio-economic characteristics 
and family makeup. The second model aims to produce an equation 
of working hours supply for the formal and informal sectors of the 
Brazilian economy. It is an investigation on how government income 
transfers affect the working hours supply. Applied for this very pur-
pose, a variation of the Durbin and McFadden (1984) method for 
the correction of selection bias based on multinomial logit models 
and also mentioned on Bourguignon et al. (2004). The database is 
extracted from the National Household Sampling Research (origi-
nally PNAD) of the year 2006 which includes heads of families.
As follows, besides this introduction, this article is segmented like 
this: the second section thoroughly describes the main federal in-
come transfer programs in Brazil. Ensued by a brief outlook on the 
existing literature on impacts and collateral effects of these income 
transfer policies. In the third section, there is an introduction of the 
econometric model for the correction of the selection bias based on 
multinomial logit models. The fourth section deals with the asses-
sment methodology that was applied, and also the definition and 
the construction of variables. Subsequently, in the fifth section, the 
results of the assessed models are analyzed.  Finally, the last section 
exhibits the conclusions resulting from the article.
2. Theoretical and Empirical Aspects of Income Transfer Programs
As a way of complementing family income, the Bolsa-Família 
Program or PBF was created in late 2003 by a temporary govern-
ment measure and was later turned into a federal law. The program 
was part of a wider project called Fome Zero (Portuguese for “Zero 
Hunger”). The PBF program presently helps more than 11 million 
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Brazilian families1 trying to overcome poverty (families whose mon-
thly income ranges from R$70,01 to R$140 per person) and families 
dealing with extreme poverty, whose monthly income is up to R$ 
70 per person). The continuity of such benefits depends on how 
beneficiaries satisfy health and education standards set up by the 
government, such as school attendance, children s´ vaccination, pre-
natal and postnatal checkups.  A family to be chosen to participate 
in the program must have monthly income of up to R$ 140,00  per 
person and also must be listed on the CadÚnico List, which is the 
social programs´  database. The main eligibility criterion being the 
per capita income declared by a family. 
Besides PBF, Brazil has today two other big federal income transfer 
programs: The Continual Installment Benefit  (a.k.a. BPC-Loas)  and 
The Child Labor Eradication Program ( or PETI).The former  is a 
monthly transfer of one minimum salary to severely disabled people 
of any age or senior citizens older than 65.  In both cases, in order 
to be eligible, one must have a per capita family income lower than 
one fourth of the minimum salary. The beneficiary of this program 
does not have to satisfy any further government standards in order 
to keep his or her recipient status. On the other hand, the PETI 
program was first implemented in 1996 for charcoal mill workers 
in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul. It was the very first federal in-
come transfer program and originally aimed to rescue children and 
teenagers younger than 16 from unhealthy, hazardous or degrading 
jobs. It also aimed right from the start to improve these youngsters´  
education and citizenship levels through a series of coupled parallel 
measures. As one goal of the program, children and teenagers get the 
necessary conditions to remain in school. This is achieved due to so-
cio-educational and socializing measures such as longer school hours.
Implementing programs of this kind has raised considerable interest 
from the national and international scientific community. Many stu-
dies have been conducted in order to assess the impact and adverse 
effects of such programs. According to Bourguignon et al. (2002), 
two kinds of approach can be applied to assess these programs. The 
first, the ex post approach, that is, the comparison between benefi-
ciary and non-beneficiary performances, most probably controlling 
selection in the first or second group when random samples are not 
available. The second, the ex ante approach, which consists of a 
simulation of the program s´ effects based on a behavioral model of 
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family members and the official rules involved in order to determine 
when an individual is eligible for the benefit or not. The first ap-
proach enables us to make an empirical and “real” assessment of the 
program s´ effects on the beneficiaries overall situation. The second 
approach aims to investigate through simulations, the program s´ im-
pact variations caused by hypothetical design changes. 
On an impact-on-child labor context, for instance, Ferro e Kassouf 
(2005) assessed the accomplishments of the Bolsa-Escola Program 
nationally using microdata from the 2004 PNAD survey. These au-
thors applied two complementary strategies in order to assess the 
program s´ effects on a family s´ decision of allowing or not their kids 
between ages 6 and 15  into the job market, as well as the weekly 
hours these kids would work. For the first part, the researchers 
estimated a pondered probit with a dependent variable was 1 for 
a working kid and 0 for a non-working kid. A binary variable indi-
cating participation or not in the program was included among the 
explanatory variables. For the second part, a work hour’s equation 
was estimated, using the same probit explanatory variables. The re-
searchers concluded that the policy was actually efficient in reducing 
the number of the kids´  weekly work hours and also, that an additio-
nal benefit was removing around three hours of these kids´  weekly 
work hours. However, these studies were not conclusive regarding 
the program s´ impact on a family decision of allowing or not a child 
into the job market.   
Bourguignon et al. (2002), on the other hand, proposed a micro-
simulation method in order to assess ex ante, the impact of the 
Bolsa-Escola program on its two dimensions: children s´ occupational 
choice and national poverty reduction. The pre-established parame-
ters used were based on a discreet multinomial choice model (logit 
multinomial) in order to know about the occupational decisions (to 
study and to work, just to study, just to work, not to study and not 
to work), the authors conducted simulations with various hypothe-
ses about the income limit level for a family s´ eligibility and the 
transfer amount. The study revealed that the proportion of kids in 
the “studying and working” occupational category grows marginally 
and that around 40% of the children between 10 and 15 years old 
were responding to the program and such proportion grows to 60% 
amongst the poorer ones. Regarding the effects of the program for 
poverty reduction, the results were less significant. The Bolsa-Escola 
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Program s´ original design reduced poverty in less than 1% and the 
Gini Index dropped to just less than 0,5%. After that, the program 
managers realized that the target public was right but the poverty 
reduction effects would come later than expected.
Regarding collateral effects, more specifically the effects of these 
policies on the job market, Danzinger et al. (1981) brought to our 
attention that most income transfer programs, by offering income 
supplements without demanding any labor performances and also 
by reducing benefits to the top income levels, generate alterations 
in the inclination and in the curve position of a beneficiary s´ budget 
restriction. This way, the existence of such effects is actual if the 
Consumer Theory is applied, once an agent maximizes usefulness 
by the ability to choose income-leisure choices due to his or her 
budget restrictions. Danzinger et al. (1981) added that individuals 
could show different labor responses according to the work hours 
option  restrictions imposed by labor laws or by employers and with 
cross-substitution effects involving job and wage  choices of  the rest 
of the family.1
When trying to detect the effects of the Bolsa-Família Program on 
the amount of work made available by mothers, Tavares (2008) used 
the Propensity Score Matching Method   in order to estimate the 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and the Heckman Correction in 
order to assess the program s´ effect on the analysis of the endoge-
nous selection problem.  When comparing the results of the two 
estimates, it was seen that both ATE and The Heckman Correction 
suggested that the program s´ impact was a 10% reduction of benefi-
ciary mothers´  work hours.
In a recent paper, Cavalcanti e Corrêa (2009) proposed a “matching” 
model with an endogenous destruction of jobs in order to ex ante 
analyze, the behavioral changes of job market agents after the on-
set of government income transfer programs.  They concluded that 
the employed agent would keep working up to where the benefit 
found in the job market was at least equal to the benefit that he or 
she would get if in a domestic production situation.  On the other 
hand, the unemployed agent as a beneficiary would keep looking 
for a job until the benefit of entering the job market was at least 
1 The Cross-Substitution Effect happens when labor supply decisions and wage decisions are 
made collectively by family members, or indirectly, when taking the family budget as a re-
ference. 
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equal to the opportunity cost of the search. This way, it was found 
that the benefit sum affected job levels in a non-positive way, the 
authors came up with the hypothesis that by increasing the benefit, 
the job opportunity cost also increases, which makes some workers 
leave their jobs in order to do domestic production. Besides, the job 
search opportunity cost also rises, which makes some agents choose 
to leave the job market and work in domestic production. (Based on 
the premise that if they take a job, they will lose the benefit).
3. The Correction of Selection Bias in Logit Multinomial Models
Among the categories of sample selection, there is one that comes up 
when the dependent variable is observed only in a specific popula-
tion subgroup. For instance, the work hour supply variable is visible 
only for individuals of strictly positive workload. In cases like these, 
selection bias is formed due to occasional truncation that happens 
when the regression variable 1y depends on the result of another 2y  
variable (possibly related to factors that are also associated with 1y ), 
so that in the interest regression, the selection-determining variables 
get omitted.
In simpler cases, where the observability of the interest variable 
is determined by a binary variable, the endogenous selection pro-
blem can be easily solved by applying the procedure proposed by 
Heckman (1979), which consists of a regression of two stages on 
the system: 
1111 uxy += β                                                                    (1a)
[ ]01 2222 >+= vxy δ                                                         (1b)
in which (1a) is the equation that explains the interest variable as a 
vector of visible characteristics 1x  and of a  1u  disturbance, called 
structural equation ; (1b) is the equation that explains the 2y  by 
2x , the observable characteristic vector  and by the latent characte-
ristics 2v , called the selection equation; ( 1x , 2x ) are always obser-
vable and the 1y variable is only observable when 12 =y .  
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According to  Heckman (1979), consistent estimators  of  1β  and 1γ  
can be obtained  by the regression of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
of 1iy over 1ix  and ( )22 ˆ,ˆ δλλ ix≡ , this last one being  an estimator 
of 2δ  obtained in a previous estimate of a probit  for  (1b), in which 
( )⋅λ  is the Inverse Mills Ratio, that is, ( ) ( )( )22
22
22 δ
δφ
δλ
x
xx
Φ
≡ 2
In more complex models, where selection happens in a multinomial 
discrete choice process, according to Bourguignon et al. (2004), the 
configuration of the problem turns into this structure: 
 111 uxy += β                                                                     (2a)
 ,
*
jjj zy ηγ += ,       j = 1, 2, ..., M                                       (2b)
where the 1u  disturbances satisfy ( ) 0,1 =zxuE  e ( ) 21 , σ=zxuV ; 
j represents a category variable that describes the agent s´ choice 
among the M alternatives based on the utilities named *jy ;  the z 
and x vectors have the variables that explain the alternatives and 
the interest variable ,respectively. Without loss of generalness, it is 
assumed that the y1 variable is observable if and only if category 1 is 
chosen, and this happens when:
( )*
1
*
1 max jj yy ≠>
This condition equals to 01 <ε  if we define that:
( ) ( )111
*
1
*
11
maxmax ηγηγε −−+=−=
≠≠
zzyy jjjjj
According to a demonstration by McFadden (1973), if it is assumed 
that the ( )jη ’s are independent and equally distributed with the 
Gumbel Distribution, this specification leads to the logit multino-
mial model, with a response probability as: 
( ) ( )∑
=<
j j
z
z
zP
γ
γ
ε
exp
)exp(
0 11
2 ( )⋅φ  and ( )⋅Φ  are respectively, the density function and the accumulated distribution func-
tion of the standard normal. 
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This way, if one starts from the abovementioned expression, consis-
tent estimates of   ( )jγ ’s   can be easily obtained through maximum 
likelihood. However, the problem still is, how to estimate the 1β  
parameter vector, taking into account that the 1u  disturbances may 
not be independent of all ( )jη ’s, so that it inserts some sort of cor-
relation between the explanatory variables and the disturbance term 
in the interest Equation (2a). Therefore, the 1β  estimates by OLS 
are consistent.
Generalizing the Heckman procedure (1979), Bourguignon et al. 
(2004) showed that the selection bias correction can be based on 
the 1u  conditional mean:
 
where { }Mzzz γγγ ,...,, 21≡Γ  e ( )Γ11 ,εuf  is the coupled density 
condition of 1u  and 1ε .
They also concluded that , as the relations between the M compo-
nents of  Γ and the M corresponding probabilities can be inverted, 
there is one single μ  function that can be replaced by λ in such a 
way that:
( ) ( )MPPuE ,...,,0 111 µε =Γ<
Therefore, 1β  consistent estimates can be obtained in one of these 
two regressions:
( ) 11111 ,..., wPPxy M ++= µβ
( ) 1111 wxy +Γ+= λβ
where 1w  is the residual that is  on average independent of the 
regressors.
However, as the estimate of many parameters is needed when there 
is a big number of alternatives, restrictions on ( )MPP ,...,1µ  or equi-
valently on λ(Γ), must be applied in order to keep the problem trea-
table. And when it comes to these restrictions, the proposed methods 
for bias correction available in literature differ from one another.
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In the method proposed by Durbin and McFadden (1984), the as-
sumed hypothesis is linearity between disturbances which is ex-
pressed as terms of the  1u  mean, conditional to the ( )jη ’s by:
( ) ( )( )∑
=
−=
Mj
jjjM EruE
,...1
11 ,..., ηησηη , with ∑
=
=
Mj
jr
...1
0                (3)
This implies that:
( ) ( )∑
=
−=
Mj
jjM ruE
...2
111 ... ηησηη
Starting from this condition, and based on the logit multinomial 
model, Durbin and Mc Fadden (1984) obtained:
,     1>∀j ,
and so they suggested that model that was described in (2a) and (2b) 
could be estimated through OLS through this equation:
                                    (4)
When analyzing such procedure, Bourguignon et al. (2004) noticed 
that the hypothesis (3) determined a specific linearity between 1u
and the Gumbel distribution of the ( )jη ’s, and thus restricting the 
kind of distributions that were allowed for 1u . So, they suggested a 
variation of the hypothesis that made linear 1u  into a normal distri-
bution group, for that would allow, in particular, that 1u  could also 
be normal with:
( ) ∑
=
=
Mj
jjM ruE
...1
**
11 ... ησηη  
3
3  Please notice that (3) is a special case of (4) for ( ) ( )jEjjJ ηηη −= and a normalization on 
the correlations, once Dubin e Mc Fadden (1984) normalize the errors, while (4) there's 
normalization due to the non-linear J transformation. 
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where *jr  are the correlations between 1u  and the normal standar-
dized variables ( ) ( )( )jjj GJ ηηη 1* −Φ== , j = 1...M.4 
Besides, based on sample selection, the authors developed these con-
ditional hopes:
( ) ( )1**1*1 ,max PmyyE
s
s =




 Γ>
≠
η
( ) ( ) ( )1,max **1* −=




 Γ>
≠
jjj
s
sj PPPmyyE η
where , j∀ , and eventually concluded 
that after modifying the hypothesis , the regression equation (4) 
could be expressed as:
 
( ) ( )( ) 1...2
*
1
*
1111 1
w
P
P
PmrPmrxy
j
j
Mj
jj +








−
++= ∑
=
σβ            (5)
According to Equation (5), the factors or variables that correct se-
lection bias are defined as )( 10 Pmm = , )1(
)(
2
2
21 −
=
P
PPmm and 
)1(
)(
3
3
32 −
=
P
P
Pmm  in which *1rσ , 
*
2rσ , 
*
3rσ ,….,
*
Mrσ  are their res-
pective parameters to be defined.
Applying  Monte-Carlo experiments in order to compare  the per-
formances of bias correction methods that are based on logit multi-
nomial models (MLM), the authors also verified that, in most cases, 
the method proposed by  Dubin e Mc Fadden (1984) is preferable 
to the most frequently  used , Lee (1984), as well as to the se-
mi-parametric alternative proposed by Dahl (2002). Experiments 
also showed that the Durbin e McFadden (1984) performance is 
very sensitive to the imposed normalization and that the suggested 
4 Notice that for every j, Bourguignon et al. (2004) assumed that the expected values of u1 and *
jη  are linearly related which is particularly true when the classic 1u  hypothesis is normal 
and 



 *,1 ju η is a bi-varied normal for any j alternative.
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variable despite usually less robust than the original version, has 
better performance when the normalization hypothesis is tampe-
red. Besides, it seems fit to capture intensively non-linear selection 
terms. For last, they concluded by using Monte-Carlo simulations 
that a selection bias correction based on the logit multinomial mo-
del provides good-enough corrections in the selection equation even 
when the hypothesis of the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) is tampered. 
4. Methodology and Database
In this section, there is a specification of the econometric models 
that will assess the impacts of government income transfers on the 
formal and informal labor supply in the Brazilian job market, con-
trolling other determiners, the job market entrance decision as well 
as the decision about work hours offered by agents. 
Table 1 - Variable Descriptions for the Multinomial Logit
Dependent variable  Description  
ocup Individual job decision  
0  Not to work
1  To work in the informal market
2  To work in the formal market
Explanatory variables for individual characteristics  
age     years of age numeric
educ     years of education  numeric
Dgender gender dummy 0 for females, 1 for males
Drace   race dummy 1 for white, 0 for other than white
Explanatory variables for socio-economic characteristics  
Dregion2  country region dummy * 1 North, 0 any other than north
Dregion3  country region dummy * 1 Northeast, 0 any other than northeast 
Dregion4  country region dummy * 1 South, 0 any other than south
Dregion5  country region dummy * 1 Midwest, 0 any other than midwest 
Dzurbanana  area dummy 1 Urban zone, 0 any other than urban zone
Explanatory variables for family  characteristics  
Dfamil2 family makeup dummy **
1 Couples with all children younger than 14, 0 other-
wise
Dfamil3 family makeup dummy ** 1 Couples with all children at 14 or older, 0 otherwise       
Dfamil4 family makeup dummy ** 1 Couples with children younger, at;, or older than 14
Dfamil5 family makeup dummy ** 1 Mother with all children younger than 14, 0 otherwise
Dfamil6 family makeup dummy **
1 Mother with all children at 14 or older than 14, 0 
otherwise
Dfamil7 family makeup dummy ** 1 Mother with children younger, at, or older than 14
Dfamil8 family makeup dummy ** 1 Other kinds of family, 0 otherwise   
(*) Southeast Region as reference; (**) Childless couple as reference.
     Source: Data researched by the authors.
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For this purpose, a sample of individuals classified by the PNAD 
national survey, on the category “Reference Person of the Family” 
which otherwise means, heads of families. Initially a logit multi-
nomial model is used, as described in Table 1 that will give the 
marginal effects on the answer probabilities P(Ocup = 0), P(Ocup 
= 1) e P(Ocup = 2), whose estimated signs will allow to see how 
the explanatory variables, particularly the income transfer variable, 
affect the agents´  decision about job market entry.  
Then, after the answer probability estimates P(Ocup = 0), P(Ocup 
= 1) e P(Ocup = 2), the model (5) is used in order to estimate the 
equation of work hours supply. On this phase, the goal is to estima-
te the effect of government income transfers on individuals´  work 
load, that is, on the hour-supply dependent variables in the informal 
sector (hours1) and the same in the formal sector (hours2), by using 
the methodology described in the previous pages, that is used for 
selection bias correction. The other control variables are  the same 
that were used for the estimating the logit multinomial, except  the 
family per capita income variable (rendper) which was replaced by 
the monthly income earned by an individual for all his work done 
(income).
The database that was used was taken from The National Survey of 
Household Samples (PNAD) conducted by The Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) in 2006,5 from which these 
variables were constructed: status of an individual in the job market 
(Ocup), income transfers from government to families (TRF), fa-
mily per capita income (rendper), work hours in the informal sector 
(hours1) and work hours in the formal sector (hours2).  
Regarding the TRF variables, the PNADs do not bring such infor-
mation. The existence of additional supplements about the income 
transfers programs shown in PNAD’s from 2004 until 2006 did not 
change the situation, as the supplementary form asked questions 
about the household and not about the specific individuals. Nor were 
these forms provided with specific questions about transfer income, 
which made it impossible to know which are the beneficiary fami-
lies, for in a home, there might be more than just one family and 
income obtained through transfers remains unknown. 
5   According to the new system of assessment adopted by IBGE in 2009 for the PNAD’s from 
2001 till 2008.
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This way, in order to calculate the amounts of family transfers, a 
filter was constructed for the entry “Savings Account Interest And 
Other Financial Investments And Other Income Sources” by se-
lecting people whose family per capita income were equal or lower 
than half minimum wage valid for that year, (i.e., R$ 175,00). It is 
supposed that the monetary value of this entry for the heads of fa-
milies selected by this filter will show the income arriving from all 
government transfers. After all, it is expected that these individuals 
are not able to have any income originated in the financial market. 
Then, in order to obtain the Family Income Transfers (TRF), income 
transfers were matched with household units which were identified 
by their serial number and family control number, and then we ad-
ded up the amounts gotten by every household member. 
Regarding the individual job market status variable (Ocup), the data 
related to the entries “worked in a reference week” and “tempora-
rily out of a reference week of remunerated work” were matched in 
order to determine the actually employed individuals. Among those 
who had done some work during a reference week, the ones to be 
regarded as formal job market workers  those who ,under the entry 
“position in the occupation of the main job during the reference 
week” were also in the categories of military, officially employed, 
statutory government worker and officially employed house worker. 
On the other hand, some individuals got categorized as informal 
market workers, namely those belonging to these segments: unoffi-
cially employed, unofficially employed house worker, self-employed 
individuals, self-supporting production workers, and people who 
were constructing dwellings for their own use. 
The family per capita income (rendper) was created from entries like 
“monthly Family income for all the household units“ and “ number 
of household  members “, whereas the  hours1 e hours2  variables 
were obtained after the construction of filters by the  summation 
of  the entries named “ number of usual work hours per week on the 
main job in the reference week”, “number of usual work hours per 
week on a secondary job” and “number of usual work hours per week 
in random jobs in the reference week”. For last, monetary variables 
included in the rendper, TRF, and income regressions were deflated 
by the PNAD income deflator, constructed by the Research Institute 
of Applied Economics (IPEA) from data provided by the National 
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Consumer Price Index – Restricted (INPC) of the IBGE statistics 
institute, and the General Price Index (IGP) of the Ministry of 
Labor based on the methodology suggested by Corseuil and Foguel 
(2002).
5. Analysis of the Results
5.1 Results of the logit Multinomial Model
Here, Table 2 shows the marginal effects obtained by using the logit 
multinomial 6 model that was estimated according to the specifics 
described on Table 2. The marginal effect of government income 
transfers is positive for unemployed heads of families and for those 
working in the informal sector. For those in the formal sector, such 
effect is negative. This result seems to imply an adverse effect of 
income transfer programs on the job market. On one side, for heads 
of family, it increases the probability of remaining unemployed or 
getting work in the informal market, on the other side, it lessens his 
or her probability of remaining employed in the formal market. 
6 The Hausman test was conducted in order to verify the irrelevant alternative independence 
hypothesis (IIA), however the test was not conclusive for the result showed variations ac-
cording to which base was chosen for estimates. Long and Freese (2006) disapproved of 
this test exactly because it is prone to showing quite contradictory results. Likewise, Cheng 
and Long (2005) through   Monte Carlo experiments, verified that both Hausman test and 
Small-Hsiao test showed little efficiency even when analyzing huge samples. Cheng and 
Long concluded that these tests are not of much use for assessing IIA Hypothesis violations. 
Besides, as Amemiya (1981) suggested, MLM works satisfactorily when alternatives are not 
close and similar, which seems to be the case of “Not to Work”, “To Work in the Formal Sec-
tor” and “To Work in the Informal Sector”.
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Table 2 - Marginal Effects for the Heads-of-family Sample 
 P(Ocup = 0) P(Ocup = 1) P(Ocup = 2)
Variable dy/dx
Standard 
error P>|z| dy/dx
Standard 
error P>|z| dy/dx
Standard 
error P>|z| 
TRF 0,0011 0,0000 0,000 0,0006 0,0001 0,000 -0,0016 0,0001 0,000
Rendper -0,0001 0,0000 0,000 0,0000 0,0000 0,000 0,0000 0,0000 0,000
age 0,0135 0,0001 0,000 -0,0050 0,0002 0,000 -0,0086 0,0001 0,000
educ -0,0048 0,0005 0,000 -0,0182 0,0005 0,000 0,0230 0,0005 0,000
Dgender* -0,2983 0,0057 0,000 0,1551 0,0054 0,000 0,1432 0,0044 0,000
Drace* -0,0134 0,0051 0,009 -0,0241 0,0056 0,000 0,0376 0,0053 0,000
Dzurban* 0,1146 0,0035 0,000 -0,2028 0,0044 0,000 0,0882 0,0041 0,000
Dfamil2* -0,0778 0,0053 0,000 0,0036 0,0057 0,531 0,0740 0,0054 0,000
Dfamil3* -0,0793 0,0043 0,000 0,0127 0,0060 0,035 0,0667 0,0060 0,000
Dfamil4* -0,1584 0,0044 0,000 0,0185 0,0070 0,008 0,1399 0,0072 0,000
Dfamil5* 0,0904 0,0098 0,000 -0,0205 0,0096 0,033 -0,0698 0,0074 0,000
Dfamil6* -0,1105 0,0053 0,000 -0,0208 0,0096 0,031 0,1313 0,0101 0,000
Dfamil7* -0,1464 0,0059 0,000 0,0562 0,1323 0,000 0,0902 0,1332 0,000
Dfamil8* -0,0152 0,0054 0,005 0,0219 0,0061 0,000 -0,0066 0,0057 0,242
Dregion2* -0,0311 0,0046 0,000 0,1437 0,0052 0,000 -0,1126 0,0038 0,000
Dregion3* -0,0008 0,0040 0,824 0,0968 0,0044 0,000 -0,0959 0,0036 0,000
region4* -0,0193 0,0045 0,000 0,0311 0,0052 0,000 -0,0118 0,0043 0,006
Dregion5* -0,0372 0,0050 0,000 0,0623 0,0059 0,000 -0,0251 0,0048 0,000
(*) The dummy variables and dy/dx represent a slight change of the dummy variable from 0 to1.
      Source: results that were obtained by the authors.
Another result is that the increase of the per capita income lessens 
the probability of a head of family of being unemployed. In an oppo-
site way, it also increases his or her probability of being employed in 
the formal or informal sectors, despite the intensity of such probabi-
lity, which is a very small one. The age of the head of family increa-
ses his or her chance of being unemployed by 1,35%. But it also con-
tributes by 0,049% e 8,6% for the diminishing of the probability of 
being employed in the informal or formal sector, respectively. This 
evidence shows what is usually debated in literature that finding a 
job is harder for older individuals. Regarding education, additional 
years of schooling will lessen by 0,48 % and 1,82% the probability 
of a head of family of being unemployed or being employed in the 
informal sector, respectively. On the other hand, an increase by 2,3% 
occurs for his or her chance of being formally employed. 
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Male heads of family when compared to their female counterparts 
show less probability of being unemployed and more probability of 
being formally or informally employed. There is a decrease of 29,8% 
in the probability of a male head of family being unemployed and 
of him being informally employed it is 15,51% and 14,32% of being 
formally employed. Caucasian heads of family are less likely to be 
unemployed or be informally employed, when compared to other 
races. In the formal market, this result is reverted. There is a drop 
of   1,34% and 2,4%, respectively, in the probabilities of being unem-
ployed and informally employed. However, the formal sector shows 
an increase of 3,75%. 
These data suggest the existence of racial profiling in the Brazilian 
job market. Regarding family makeup, single mothers who are heads 
of family and with children under 14 are the ones with the biggest 
chance of being unemployed and the smallest chance to work in 
both formal and informal sectors. There is a 9,04% increase in the 
probability of being unemployed and decreases by 2,05 % and 6,98 % 
of being informally and formally employed, respectively. This result 
clearly reveals the hardships found by mothers heading families with 
small children in adjusting a professional activity to their efforts in 
caring and educating their children. 
The Brazilian regions show differences in job market occupations. 
When compared to the southeastern region, the north, the south 
and the Midwest regions have less probability of an individual of 
getting unemployed and bigger probabilities in the informal market. 
However, heads of family from the southeast have bigger chances of 
being employed in the formal sector, when compared to their coun-
terparts in other regions. 
5.2 Results of the Estimate of Work Hour Supply 
The estimated results of the equation of work hours supply for 
heads of family, Equation (5), for the formal and informal sectors 
are shown on Table 3. Regarding the significance of the estimated 
coefficient, a 5% significance level was given. The first obtained 
result is the evidence of an adverse incentive of income transfers on 
the job market. For both informal and formal sectors, the estimated 
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signal of this variable is negative and statistically significant. That is, 
government income transfers seem to be working against the increa-
se of work hour supply. 
Table 3 - Second Stage Regressions for selection bias Correction of the Sample 
of Heads of Family 
 hours1 hours2
Variable Coef.
Standard 
error
t Value-p| Coef. Standard error t Value-p|
TRF -0,0183 0,0026 -7,17 0,000 -0,0239 0,0080 -3,00 0,003
Income 0,0039 0,0001 30,92 0,000 0,0008 0,0001 8,87 0,000
Age -0,1856 0,0215 -8,62 0,000 -0,1674 0,0255 -6,57 0,000
Education 0,2313 0,0534 4,33 0,000 0,0464 0,1450 0,31 0,758
Dgender 8,1013 0,5203 15,57 0,000 3,7265 0,4464 8,35 0,000
Drace 0,1741 0,2586 0,67 0,501 0,3753 0,2713 1,38 0,167
Dzurban 1,4515 0,4792 3,03 0,002 0,8608 1,0559 0,82 0,415
Dfamil2 1,4410 0,2586 5,37 0,000 1,2973 0,2906 4,46 0,000
Dfamil3 1,2350 0,4792 4,21 0,000 0,6732 0,2951 2,28 0,023
Dfamil4 2,7841 0,2686 6,83 0,000 1,6797 0,4536 3,70 0,000
Dfamil5 -2,3154 0,2933 -5,05 0,000 -0,3732 0,4460 -0,84 0,403
Dfamil6 1,0574 0,4076 3,35 0,001 1,3101 0,5563 2,35 0,019
Dfamil7 -0,5125 0,4587 -0,85 0,398 0,9164 0,4961 1,85 0,065
Dfamil8 -0,3572 0,4497 -1,29 0,197 -0,2919 0,2338 -1,25 0,212
Dregion2 -2,6164 0,6051 -6,79 0,000 -3,6490 0,9298 -3,92 0,000
Dregion3 -2,4901 0,2766 -8,42 0,000 -2,2579 0,6884 -3,28 0,001
Dregion4 0,3601 0,3852 1,47 0,142 -0,9299 0,1989 -4,67 0,000
Dregion5 -0,7283 0,2965 -2,59 0,010 -1,1305 0,3229 -3,50 0,000
m0 -15,5978 0,2454 -5,66 0,000 -6,9832 2,5677 -2,72 0,007
m1 -12,3781 0,2809 -17,89 0,000 -15,5961 3,2571 -4,79 0,000
m2 -3,8233 2,7720 -1,38 0,168 2,1532 2,1982 0,98 0,327
const. 42,9659 1,2286 34,97 0,000 37,6235 3,9166 9,61 0,000
Obs. number= 43.768    F(21,43746) = 278,64                      Obs. number = 34.027 F(21,34005) = 71,19
Prob.>F = 0,000  R2 = 0,1180  R2aj = 0,1176                          Prob.>F = 0,000  R2 = 0,0421  R2aj = 0,0415
Source: results that were obtained by the authors.
Regarding the remaining determiners, the bigger a head of family s´ 
income, the bigger the work hours supply available for him or her 
in the formal and informal sectors. The estimated signal for this 
variable is positive and significant as seen on Table 3. Likewise, edu-
cation which was measured by the average of school years, does 
contribute for the increase of the work hour supply in both sectors. 
On the other hand, age of heads of family has a negative impact on 
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the work hour supply in both sectors of the job market. That is, 
older people tend to offer less work hours in whatever sector of the 
job market. Additionally, one can infer that urban area inhabitants 
or people who live in the southeast region offer comparatively more 
work hours than those residing in rural areas or other regions of 
Brazil. Regarding gender, the estimated coefficient of this variable s´ 
dummy suggests that men usually offer more work hours than wo-
men. Regarding family makeup dummies of heads of family, the 
characteristic of a mother being the head of family with children 
younger than 14 means less work hours when compared to the re-
maining categories. 
The conclusion is, the selection bias correction was necessary, for in 
Equation (5), among the three variables m0, m1 and m2 that spot the 
existence of non-observable variables, the first two variables were 
significant.  
6. Final Thoughts
The main goal of the investigation conducted for this article seems 
to have been achieved. Government income transfers contributed 
to the increase of the probability of a head of family being unem-
ployed and be working in the informal sector. However, this effect 
is negative when it comes to the formal sector. This result shows 
an adverse effect of income transfers programs on the job market. 
On one side, these transfers increase the probability of a head of 
family being unemployed or working in the informal market but on 
the other side, they lessen his or her chances of getting employed in 
the formal market. Possibly, a replacement effect might be happe-
ning, as individuals are encouraged to leave the formal sector for the 
informal one.  
The per capita income decreases the probability of a head of family 
being unemployed and increases his or her chances of being for-
mally or informally employed, despite the estimates of such effects 
are very small. In opposition to this, the age of a head of family 
contributes with a 1,35%  increase  to his or her chances of being 
unemployed, but also contributes with between 0,049% to 8,6%  to 
the reduction of the probability of being employed in the informal 
and in the formal market, respectively. This evidence resonates with 
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a topic usually debated in economics literature – Older individuals 
have a harder time finding a job.  Education measured by an average 
of school years, contributes to a 0,48%  decrease of the probability 
of a head of family being unemployed and a 1,82% decrease of him 
or her be working in the informal sector. However, there is an in-
crease by 2,3% of the probability of one being employed in the for-
mal sector. Men compared to women showed a smaller probability 
of being unemployed and a bigger probability of being employed in 
the formal or informal sector. The evidence of racial profiling seems 
to get confirmed. White head-of-family individuals do have fewer 
chances of being unemployed or employed in the informal market 
than individuals of other races do. This happens the other way round 
in the formal market. 
Single head-of-family mothers who have children younger than 14 
years old are the ones with bigger chances of getting unemployed 
and less probability of working in the formal and informal sectors. 
This result clearly shows the hard time that head-of-family mothers 
with little children have in harmonizing a professional job schedule 
to their motherly duties, such as general care and education of their 
children. Heads of family in the north, south and midwest regions 
have smaller probabilities of getting unemployed and the biggest 
probabilities in the informal market. However, heads of family in 
the southeast region have bigger chances of being employed in the 
formal sector than individuals in the other regions.
Regarding the analysis of hours offered in the job market, the evi-
dence of an adverse effect caused by income transfers seems to be 
real. Either in the formal or informal sectors, government income 
transfers seem to be disincentivizing increases of work-hour supply. 
When it comes to other determiners, the bigger the income of a head 
of family, bigger is the amount of work hours that are supplied in the 
formal and informal sectors. Similarly, when education is analyzed 
and measured by the average of education years, it contributes to an 
increase of hours supplied in both sectors. Coming the opposite way, 
the age of these individuals negatively impacts on the hours supplied 
in the two sectors. Additionally, one can infer that urban area inha-
bitants or south region inhabitants in comparison, offer more work 
hours than those residing in rural areas and remaining regions of the 
country. Regarding gender, men offer more work hours than women. 
About family makeup of heads of family, the mother-with-children
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-younger-than-fourteen characteristic means less work hours offered, 
when compared to the other categories. In sum, government income 
transfers seem to show adverse effects on the Brazilian job market. 
They affect both the entrance decision and the work-hour supply.  
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